the indonesian mass killings.
The Indonesian mass killing of 1965-66 was a purge of people affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). A series of events and rising tensions between the Indonesian army and PKI culminated in the killing of 500,000 to over 1 million people.
Tensions began rising when Indonesia gained independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1945 as political instability and power struggles followed. President Sukarno rose to power, seeking to unite Indonesia’s diverse and conflicted people, without much success.
In the 1950s, the PKI started growing in both membership and influence. As Sukarno sought to cement his rule, he drew support from the PKI in his coalition known as “NASAKOM”; also consisting of the military and religious groups. However, the PKI was seen as potentially existential threat to the military and the largest religious group in Muslims, putting the coalition in direct contradiction. As the 1960s approached, Sukarno started losing power due to economic instability and political factions started mounting their challenges to power. The military, led by General Suharto soon became a strong force. At the same time, however, the PKI were at their peak and actively threatened the lives of many anti-communist individuals. Tensions were high and everyone expected a civil war to begin.
On September 30, 1965, a group of junior military officers with alleged links to the PKI staged an attempted coup, now known as the September 30 Movement. Six senior generals were kidnapped and killed. The military and affiliated media blamed the PKI for orchestrating the coup and used this event to stoke hatred and fear against the PKI. The military then initiated a campaign to eradicate communism by dismantling the PKI. This involved first executing the upper leadership, then bringing army units into the streets to hunt down and kill Communists.
By the end of the mass killing, power was consolidated under Suharto and he assumed the presidency in 1967. He banned the now-virtually nonexistent PKI, and in tandem with the military, eradicated Communist influence in Indonesia almost entirely.
Note that the artefacts on display consist of different U.S. sources due to the lack of quality Indonesian sources pertaining to intervention — most of it was unknown prior to the U.S. declassifying information anyway.
Exhibit A - classified documents from the U.S. embassy
(U.S. classified perspective)
"US Department of State, Airgram A-398 to U.S. Embassy Jakarta, Secret — A document that lists out the status of many prominent PKI members during the height of the massacre.
Miscellaneous content from the airgram
The Jakarta Embassy has received reports about the arrests of several PKI leaders. There is widespread falsification of documents such as alleged confessions – one PKI Politburo member appeared to be unaware of the Politburo’s composition/structure. His remarks are based on the Politburo structure before May 1965.
“RJ Martens” is written as one of the intended recipients, originally hidden under a SECRET classification.
The airgram includes a list of the status and present whereabouts of PKI (Communist Party) leaders based on all information the Jakarta embassy + State Dept has. Most are captured, dead, or arrested, or under army control. Only one person is reported on the loose (Sudieman). A raw list is on the right:
Implication
The US actively knew of the crackdown: it was in possession of a list of the killings as the situation had already developed. The classified list had detailed information about the whereabouts of everyone. This shows that the US had intimate knowledge of what was happening.
Additionally, the U.S. had considered providing aid/weapons covertly, but found it too risky both in chance of success and public backlash. A State Department political advisor asked Ambassador Green what to do in the “reasonable possibility that the Indonesian Army might request our help against a PKI insurgency”. A week later, Green would request the Johnson administration to “explore [the] possibility of short-term one shot aid on covert, non-attributable basis”
Even without directly helping, the U.S. followed the events very closely, and if not for its support, it is probably that the army would never have got the confidence to take power and be so ruthless with the killing.
On the other hand, however, the main basis for the PKI leadership status reports seems to be open-source intelligence: things like the media and army press releases. However, there are also sources like “reliable source” which may suggest insider information.
Conclusion
The implication of this intervention - or in this case the impact of their actions - is that they were, at a minimum, complicit/stood by and as a result allowed the deaths of hundreds of thousands, as the quiet support from a superpower is pivotal in emboldening such ruthless actions. Also probable is that the U.S. provided this list, and helped the killings became more effective, in this case a clearly negative intervention.
It is important to note this is not a black and white situation. Many details are still left quite vague, especially pertaining to the sourcing of information, as much of the status report is derived from public sources — this potentially suggests that the U.S. could have low involvement. On the other hand, small parts of the report include insider sources.
The final implication is therefore, given the limited details, that standing by is tantamount to complicity. No matter the level of facilitation, the army had power: all they needed was confirmation that no higher power could stop them.
A meeting to discuss the quelling of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Central Java, 1965. Photo: Perpusnas RI
Exhibit B - Interview with U.S. embassy personnel active during the killings
(Retired high-level personnel perspective)
Details
Interview with Robert J. Martens, a former member of the U.S. Embassy's political section in Jakarta
Interviewer: Charles Stuart Kennedy, an oral historian of American diplomats. Conducted 1000+ oral histories of retired American diplomats
Date: September 13, 1991
Background
Robert Martens allegedly led a group of State Department and CIA officials to create a list of around 5,000 Communist Party operatives, and provided it to an intermediary of the Indonesian Army. His job was to compile public figures & thousands of people the U.S. wanted dead, then hand over to the army. He would receive the list back with names ticked off, designating who was eliminated – captured or killed – all allegedly.
Robert Martens' Perspective
The information was all public, but because the KPI didn’t have a public O-chart, it was difficult to tie everything together into a structure. Martens spent his time years before trying to understand the KPI’s organisation by reading the communist press and carding the position names.
An aide to Adam Malik – who at this point is high-level and close to the army – came to him for knowledge on the KPI. Martens gave the list to the aide, who gave it to Malik, who gave it to the army. Martens is unsure what effect this had.
"About a month after the coup, a man came to my house who was a chief aide to Adam Malik. Malik had been one of the few leaders who had stood up to the communists and he now became very close to the army. This fellow said, “I have been told by friends in the diplomatic corps, not from Americans, that you know more about the Indonesian communist party than anybody else. So could you help me?” I said, “Sure.”
So I talked with this fellow at some length, and over time I discovered that he, at least, didn't have, and perhaps the army didn't have, a very organized collection of data on the communist party. Everybody knew the big names … but I had a kind of structure.
[The information was public in the KPI newspaper, but people may have feared collecting information about it because terror was so great before the coup]
So I gave some of this basic newspaper material to him, and he took it to Malik, and Malik apparently gave it to the army. What effect it had, if any, I don't know. It was certainly not a death list."
Robert J. Martens, during the interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy
Martens believes it was a “means for the non-communists that were basically fighting for their lives” as the situation was precarious before the September 30 coup. In his view, they were in self-defence, fighting off a communist threat to their lives.
Analysis
The U.S. embassy did help give the Indonesians targets, but Martens questions the level of malice, and emphasises that the information was public already – no classified information was handed over. It is a “kill list” nonetheless that likely helped the Indonesian army, but is rather underwhelming, which – according to Martens – grants the giving of the list some legitimacy. Additionally, his perspective that the communists were threatening their livelihoods gives his decision more moral grounding.
Conditions leading up to the attempted coup
Robert Martens provides two stories of witnessing peopleæ being actively threatened by Communists. A young man who was teaching him Indonesian on Sundays: he last saw him when he came to his porch saying that people were out hunting for him. Martens walked the man to a bus stop far away, and never saw him again – he believes the man was killed shortly after leaving him.
A professor who had his life threatened by communists, who was fearful that he would never see Martens again. By coincidence, they met again when the situation was bad for the non-communists – the professor broke down crying as he was certain he would be “destroyed” if the communists took power.
"It was a means for the non-communists that were basically fighting for their lives—remember the outcome of a life or death struggle between the communists and non-communists was still in doubt—to know the organization of the other side..."
Robert Martens, in interview
Implication
This could be the rationale for people in the US/UK embassy to be indifferent to the killings and be complicit in them, as the communists are seen as a physical, violent threat. The mass killings, to them, may be seen as eliminating the PKI as a threat, and preventing communism from (literally) hurting more people. Earlier in the interview, Martens already establishes that the PKI engaged in widespread violence. Although this is not irrefutable evidence that the PKI were a systematic terror group/threatened people en masse, this would likely have prevented US embassy personnel from being sympathetic to the communists.
Conclusion
This shows that the US’ actions were limited and trivial, and quite innocuous. The implication of the U.S. involvement is more neutral - they were not facilitating the killings, or at most, helped very little. Additionally this reduces the culpability of the international community – they cannot really be to blame.
A meeting to discuss the quelling of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Central Java, 1965. Photo: Perpusnas RI
U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia (circa 1970)
“I remember a young man who had been teaching me Indonesian on Sundays. The last time I saw him he went out the front gate and came running back to my porch saying that he had seen some people laying for him out there who were trying to kill him. I took him out the back way, and walked him up to a bus stop some distance in the opposite direction so I could protect him as far as I could. … I never saw this young man again even though I had offered to help put him through college the next year. … I'm convinced that he was killed by the communists shortly after he left my house although I have no direct proof.”
Robert Martens, from the interview
A mob attacks the Res Publica University in Jakarta, Indonesia, 12 October 1965. Photograph: Bettmann
"I had some very similar experiences with a professor at the University of Indonesia that I used to see during my first year in Jakarta. Later he was intimidated by the communists at an academic symposium and his life was threatened if he continued to advocate noncommunist views. He became so fearful thereafter that he wouldn't see me anymore. I ran into him by accident on neutral ground later. This was … when things were really looking very bleak for the non-communists … I said “So and so, you can see how things are going as well as I.” The man, an ethnic Chinese, started crying … He said, “I know how it's going, and if the communists take over, and it looks like its 95% certain they will, I will be destroyed even though I have tried to take on a neutral image. But that's not going to work, both me and my family will be exposed to persecution.”
Robert Martens, from the interview
Exhibit C - official documentary historical record of U.S. foreign policy
(Official, public U.S./CIA perspective)
Details
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.
Editor: Edward C. Keefer
General Editor: David S. Patterson
Published in 2000
Airgrams
State Dept to Jakarta Embassy
October 13, 1965
“With respect to [Indonesian army aide's] question re our assessment of situation, suggest you respond on following lines: We are, as always, sympathetic to army's desire eliminate communist influence, but difficult for us to assess current situation since we do not have clear picture of military aims and plans. Realize situation fast moving, but would be helpful if we could be given indication to army's assessment and intentions.”
Implication
The U.S. wants to help the anti-communists, but is unsure of what the whole situation looks like.
Indonesia Embassy to State Dept
October 14, 1965
“We are taking cautious approach to providing further assistance of this kind although it is in our interest to preserve present army leadership from danger assassination which we assess very real.”
“Also believe small quiet gesture such as this could be important in terms of helping a friend in need and will be remembered accordingly.”
“Conceivably army has intention to seek again from US sources equipment for communications with outer islands.”
Implication
The embassy has already provided assistance to the Indonesia Army, and is expecting them to seek more assistance – especially for communications equipment. The embassy also sees this as a quid pro quo – could be useful for the future. At the end, however, such an innocuous request may not be obviously linked to politicide — nonetheless this counts as aiding.
Jakarta Embassy to State Dept, providing a status report on the situation
October 20, 1965
The party received major damage to its image, structures, and organisational strength through arrests, harassment, and executions
1000+ PKI were arrested in Jakarta alone, several hundred executed
Emphasises the importance of taking the PKI out, even though they’re almost incapacitated: as it would be a sign of anti-PKI weakness
“Army has nevertheless been working hard at destroying PKI and I, for one, have increasing respect for its determination and organisation in carrying out this crucial assignment.”
Implication
The embassy is receiving intimate reports of the situation, possibly implying some sort of communication between the Indonesian army and the embassy. The bolded quote above also implies that the embassy is in support of the mass killings/destroying PKI.
State Dept to Jakarta Embassy, status report:
October 22, 1965
“In view foregoing, we assume Indos will want avoid anything looking like overt [Indonesia Government] turn toward U.S. For short run our assistance to them would probably have to be on covert or semi-covert basis related specific, small, ad hoc needs. We quite willing go along with this.”
Implication
The U.S. is enthusiastic to support the Indonesian government to destroy the PKI, however is afraid of doing it overtly.
Ambassador Green to State Dept, providing another update of the fate of PKI leaders
August 10, 1966
New information since March 1966 on 15 senior PKI figures, listed 4 dead, 20 imprisoned
According to Ambassador Green: Unclassified version of the list was already given to the Indonesian government by December 1965 - “apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership”
Implication
The nature of the embassy’s help was providing a public list to a seemingly incompetent Indonesian army, who didn’t even know who the PKI higher-ups were.
FRUS: Quote Gallery
“On August 10, 1966, Ambassador Green sent airgram A–74 to the Department, drafted by Marten and approved by Masters, which provided as an enclosure another update of the fate of PKI leaders. Airgram A–74 provided new information available since March 1966 on 15 senior PKI figures and listed 4 senior PKI officials reported dead and 20 reported imprisoned. This airgram, which was signed by Green, indicated that: “A sanitized [ie. Embassy attribution removed] version of the lists in A–398 has been made available to the Indonesian Government last December [1965] and is apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership at the time (lists of other officials in the PKI affiliates, Partindo and Baperki were also provided to GOI officials at their request).” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 12 INDON) Partindo was a small left wing party that was closely allied with larger and more influential Baperki, an association of Indonesians of Chinese descent.”
Quote from Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXVI
Sukarno and Nixon (1956). Published by the United States Information Service.
President Sukarno is greeted by President Dwight Eisenhower at the White House (1956). National Archives and Records Administration, Still Picture Unit, 306-N-56-8300.
Suharto with U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Jakarta (6 December 1975). Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
President John F. Kennedy with Suharto in Washington D.C. (1961). Associated Press.
What the embassy knew
At the end of October 1965, the Jakarta embassy began to receive “reports of killings and atrocities against PKI members, which were generally reported upon in the context of continued armed PKI resistance.” On October 29, the embassy reported that “Moslem fervor in Atjeh apparently put all but few PKI out of action. Atjehnese have decapitated PKI and placed their heads on stakes along the road. Bodies of PKI victims reportedly thrown into rivers or sea as Atjehnese refuse 'contaminate Atjeh soil.”. The implication is at this point, the U.S. sees this more as a guerilla conflict.
Gradually, the embassy realised it wasn’t a guerilla conflict, but a PKI purge. On November 13, 1965, it received a report of PKI killing every night in consistent numbers. On February 25, 1966 it noted the death toll at 80,000, with “no end in sight”.
Overall implication
Given the context that the US inherently wants to help anti-communists, especially in a guerilla war, in addition to this information that they were uncertain about what was occurring, the U.S. could not have expected the situation to manifest like this. However, the U.S. did not seem to falter upon realising that it was a large-scale mass killing.
Conclusion
The U.S. did provide help to the Indonesian army, just not significant enough to cause escalation. Mostly, the U.S. saw the killings as part of a war, but when they realised, they just silently cheered the army on. The implication of their involvement is first, that bystanding would allow things to escalate dramatically, and second, insignificant help may not be a material advantage, but could possibly embolden the army to be more brutal.