the bosnian genocide.

A brutal week-long genocide after the fall of the UN safe zone established in Srebrenica, over 8,000 Bosniaks fell under the hands of the Serbs.

The genocide was a result of the Yugoslavia breakup civil war, whereby the six republic states of Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia attempted to form their own independent republics. However, the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) aimed to unite Yugoslavia together by eliminating all the other governments. The YPA was gradually taken over by Slobodan Milošević’s Serbs and Montenegrins, who aimed to retain as much power by creating a Greater Serbia that took up parts of Croatia and Bosnia.

This was achieved through violence and multiple war crimes, ranging from genocide, ethnic cleansing and mass rape. Following this bloody path to form the Greater Serbia was the Srebenica genocide, which was a result of the Serb invasion after a UN “safe zone” containing Bosniaks refugees collapsed.

Image credits: Aljazeera, 2023

Exhibit 1 – UK Stabilisation Unit Project Report on Bosnian Conflict and Srebrenican Genocide

Introduction

As part of the United Kingdom (UK) Government Stabilization Unit; a project dedicated to understanding the long-term implications of foreign intervention on regional conflicts, this paper was written by New Zealand UN peacemaker David Harland in order to argue that the approach taken towards the Dayton peace agreement of Bosnia was incorrect due to a misguided narrative on conflict amongst Western nations. It is a critical and holistic breakdown of the context, actions and results of the bloody war and subsequent massacres in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

“International responses to the crisis in Yugoslavia were generally reactive and incoherent… Europe acted at cross-purposes with the US. International organizations, such as the UN and NATO, were given conflicting mandates and undermined one another.”

- David Harland, 2017

A wounded child from Srebrenica being carried off a UN truck (Euler, 1994).

February 1992

Carrington-Cutileiro Peace Plan

The first proposed plan was the Carrington-Cutileiro Peace Plan, chaired by Portuguese diplomat José Cutileiro; aimed to enable Bosnia's independence but divide it into three "cantons," each dominated by one of the three ethno-religious communities. It was signed by all three leaders in Lisbon but fell apart after President Izetbegović suddenly withdrew following a meeting with a US ambassador – leading to continued conflict.

July 1992

UNPROFOR Deployment

The collapse of the Carrington-Cutileiro plan led to the UN to launch the largest humanitarian effort since the Berlin airlift. The UN deployed forces, known as UNPROFOR, with a mandate to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo by any means necessary. The humanitarian effort was successful in preventing Bosnians from dying of cold or hunger but did little to stop ethnic cleansing.

January 1993

Vance-Owen Peace Plan

The Vance-Owen Peace Plan mirrored the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan’s canton system, but with ten cantons that were based on the existing locations of each ethno-religious group, removing the need for each group to move. The US stance was to publicly support the Vance-Owen plan while making it clear that the US would not help implement it, ultimately causing the Bosnian Serbs to reject the deal.

April 1993

Joint Action Plan

A diplomatic compromise known as the Joint Action Plan was formed by the US, France, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. It established six safe zones for Muslims guarded by UNPROFOR, despite the UN secretariat being highly against this proposal. The safe zones were established with the addition of 7,000 troops primarily provided by France. However, the establishment of safe zones created unintended red tape and put those living in the zones in danger.

May 1993

International Criminal Tribunal

The UN established the International Criminal Tribunal to prosecute those violating international laws in Yugoslavia. However, these peace establishments did not stop the Croats from continuing their conflict and military operations to seize Serbia, which ultimately failed. The Serbs had expanded and taken up most of Eastern Bosnia but faltered at Srebrenica and handed control of Mt Igman to the UN during the summer.

August 1993

Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan

The initial Vance-Owen plan failed due to incoherent divisions and was replaced by the Owen-Stoltenberg proposal, which divided the territory into larger blocks. However, President Izetbegović ultimately pulled out, leading to the war continuing. The Serbs believed that increased pressure would lead to land-for-peace deals, which resulted in a mortar attack in Sarajevo that killed 70 civilians. The UN and NATO threatened to bomb the Serbs if they did not pull back.

February 1994

Contact Group Plan

The Contact Group Plan, formed by the five Western powers alongside Russia, simplified previous plans and divided Bosnia into the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The plan assumed that Croats and Bosniaks were the same group, creating ethnic tensions. As the Serbs still held 70% of the country at the time, they decided not to accept the offer, resulting in a polarization of Bosniak Serbs as extremists.

December 1994

Hostility Cessation Agreement

At this stage, all three parties believed that going on the offensive was necessary to end the war. Former US President Carter mediated an unsuccessful "Cessation of Hostilities Agreement." Serbs applied more pressure, and the UN retaliated with an airstrike, leading to the Serbs holding 400 UN soldiers hostage. The situation was a turning point for UNPROFOR, leading the UN forces to secretly prepare for a large-scale NATO intervention.

July 1995

Srebrenica Genocide

The Srebrenica genocide occurred when Bosnian Serb forces, led by General Ratko Mladić, overran the UN-declared "safe area" of Srebrenica, where thousands of Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) refugees had sought shelter. Despite being under the protection of Dutch UN peacekeepers, the town was captured, and the Bosnian Serb forces proceeded to systematically execute around 8,000 Bosniak men and boys. The massacre was later classified as an act of genocide by international courts.

August 1995

Operation Deliberate Force

In response to the Srebrenica massacre, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995. This was a sustained air campaign aimed at degrading the Bosnian Serb military capabilities and forcing them to the negotiating table. The air campaign, combined with a ground offensive by the Croatian army, was successful in shifting the balance of power on the ground, leading the Serbs to negotiate for peace.

The signing of the Dayton agreement in the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on 21 November 1995 (Schlumbohm, 1995).

Understanding the Dayton Agreement – A bandage that did not heal the wound

Three weeks after the official end to the Bosnian conflict, the three parties composing of President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević; President of Croatia Franjo Tuđman; and the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović were brought to the Wright-Patterson Air Base in Dayton, Ohio for peace negotiations – Holbrooke chose this location to showcase the power of the US.

The Dayton Agreement implemented the 51:49 division originally planned from the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, with the Serbs accepting the 49% cut – this was a controversial decision, as rather than employing the Vance-Owen plan and having 10 cantons such that the Serbs belonged in their pre-war locations, the simplified Contact Group plan was used, giving Serbs a collectively grouped land whilst lumping the Bosniaks and Croats together.

Furthermore, a whole new constitution of Bosnia was created in English, and implemented a decision-making system designed to allow communities to block the actions of other communities. The key downsides to this were the unreasonably nationalistic rules implemented: One of the three seats in the collective presidency had to be a Serb directly elected from Republika Srpska. Alongside this, the nine annexes of the constitution were weak and unspecific, giving lots of power to the UN Implementation Force (IFOR), which was essentially the lookout for potential conflicts.

Short-Term Impacts of Foreign Intervention on Post-Genocide

During the first year of the Dayton Agreement’s implementation, the IFOR implemented the minimum amount of military action whilst civilian aspects were slow – this was due to the IFOR’s only concern being to ensure 0 soldier casualties, and thus refused to assist civilians in protecting their homes or to help those displaced to return to their original nations. As such, 100,000 Serbs who continued to live in Sarajevo after the war mostly left, whilst some were driven out by Serb extremists out of their own will, as they lived as a minority in the Bosniac/Croat dominated region.

IFOR did not want to take action on the Serb extremists, politicians responsible for war crimes and the controlling nationalist media despite their heinous actions. Likewise, the civilian side was extremely limited in terms of capacity of action, due to how little resources, supplies and manpower Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, was given as the first High Representative. Voting soon took place; implementing a system of three seats, each one from one of the three core nations – often led to candidates merely mobilizing their constituents and fear-mongering others, with moderates marginalized.

Healing from the Bosnian War

By 1996, the Serbs and Bosniak constituents were fully physically separated. Additionally, there were no longer any outbreaks in conflict – as such, many deemed the Dayton peace agreement as redemption when compared to United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)’s failure to prevent the Srebrenica genocide.

There were several benefits from the structural framework provided by the UN:

1. The Central Bank established a stable currency in Bosnia – the Bosnia-Herzegovina Convertible Marka – pushing the old Bosnia and Herzegovina dinar, Croatian kuna and Yugoslav novi dinar to the side. This facilitated economic transactions between different nations.

2. Randomized vehicle plates meant that Bosnians could travel to any part of Bosnia anonymously, preventing the exacerbation of ethno-religious tensions.

3. The Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) succeeded IFOR, indicting those from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; and pressuring extremist media outlets. As such, substantial action against oppressive parties ensured healing actually happened.

PDF Loading... - "Never again: International intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina" by David Harland

UK Stabilisation Unit Project Paper – Never again: International intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Harland, 2017).

“Quite unnecessarily, [the Dayton Agreement] created enduring constitutional arrangements which were both unworkable and discriminatory, and which have prevented the emergence of moderate and pragmatic political forces.”

- David Harland, 2017

In Retrospect: Failure of the Dayton Agreement

Admittedly, whilst the Dayton Agreement has not been violated since its establishment, it cannot be denied that Bosnia remains one of the most dysfunctional, poor and educationally insufficient nations. Whilst Bosnia briefly recovered from reconstruction funds, it stagnated due to the nationalist elites preventing privatization, resulting in corruption and inefficiency. In fact, a report in 2015 showed that in the Republika Srpska, only 10 of the 1,200 privatized companies survived – furthermore, companies would often file for bankruptcy rather than actually investing in business, further crippling any forms of economic growth.

A core reason behind this is the sheer complexity of the Dayton agreement: Therein lies 14 levels of governance, alongside 100 political parties and 700 members of parliament – the sheer layers of complexity prevent any real impactful political shifts from lower-class members. Bosnia ultimately falls under the “carrot and stick” approach – the lure is acquiring EU membership, which entails Bosnia doing everything to fulfill their guidelines whilst receding in every other possible domain; with the stick is the Bonn Powers that give the High Representative with sweeping powers, such as removing officials and implementing interim measures.

The uncomfortable reality: Bosnia is in immense economic and social distress, primarily due to the short-sightedness of the Dayton agreement, leading it to being the poorest nation in Europe due to an inherently faulty constitution. With the youth emigrating, a massive brain drain and drastically dropping fertility rates, Bosnia must find a solution to the Dayton agreement in order to rebuild itself.

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